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F O R E W O R D  
W m . T  IS MONOPOLY? How does it affect the rank 
and file of. the American people? In what forms does 
it appear? - 
Through the work of the Temporary'National Eco- 
nonic cob i t t e e ,  our gbvernment has provided from . 
public funds a wealth of factual material on these and 
kindred questions. And1 facts assembled in the volumi- . 
nous hearings and reports of the TNEC should have the 
widest possible circulation, for they provide chap tQ and 
verse on the tremendous concentration of economic . 
power which threatens, from within, the vitality of our 
- political democracy. 
. Some of the more important: findings of ;he TNEC on 
. monopoly and the concentration of economic power are 
briefly told in ,th& pamphlet. And the facts ,make it 
- ,inescapably clear that a tremendous responsibility rests 
upon the American people-wage-workers, farinem; small 
business' 'men, housewives, technically trained profes-' 
' sionals-all the tens of millions who have been compelled 
t~ contribute to the Super-profits of big business. That ' 
the. ec~nomi'c power of these big busi~ess men who are 
monopolists and finance capitalists mus,t be held in check, 
, none would den);. Just how this can be done is the 
question. - 
Could we restore free competition of private enter- . .  
prise? And if we could, what would happena to the tre- 
- rnekdous technical gains in production methods and ip- 
dustrial integration which have been entangled with the. ' 
. evils of monopolv? Must we cut down the fruitful tree 
5 
of large-scale production in order to destroy  he poison- 
ous vine of monopoly? 
In the present war the democratic forces of organized 
labor are showing a new political maturity. As they play 
their more active role in determining policies of produc- 
tion and I restraining dictatorial and fascist trends -within 
our own country, they may also point the way to a solu- 
tion of this problem. Such a solution is urgently needed. 
For the political democracy, which we are defending 
in this war, will not long survive unless we can also build 
a new foundation of 'democracy in our economic life. 
Traditionally our democra'tic state was based upon the 
economic democracy of farmers and artisans whol.owned 
their land and tools. . Will the ,4merican people create 
new forms of economic democracy, adapted to the fullest 
peacetime utilization of our large-scale industry? 
Confidence ih such a future ' achievement would more 
actively unite us in our determination to destroy the fas- 
cism of the Axis countries and defend our political de- 
mocracy within the United States. ' 
This pamphlet for the most part is made up of excerpts 
from the extensive hearings, monographs and reports of 
the TNEC. It puts the findings of the committee chiefly 
in its own words or in brief summaries , .  that include the 
maid points of the final rep&t. - 
All of the facts are related to the major subject of'the 
investigation: the concentration of wealth, ownership and 
corporate control in the United states. Many phases of 
the investigation relating to labor conditions, technologi- 
cal progress, unemployment; insurance companies, hous- 
ing, taxation, fiscal policy and the like are not dealt with 
'in this pamphlet. The reports and monographs on these 
subiects are all recommended As rich sources of in- s 
foqmation. 8 
LABOR RESEARCH ASSOCIATION 
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THE INDICTMENT OF MONOPOLY 
IN A MESSAGE to Congress April 29, 1938, relating to 
the concentration of economic power and' its effects on 
the capitalist sys tern, President ~oosevel t declared: 
"The first truth is that the liberty of a democracy is 
not safe if the people tolerate the- growth of private 
' 
power to a. point where it becomes stronger than their 
democratic state itself. That, in its essence, is fascism. . . . 
" ~ m o n ~  us today a concentration of private 'power 
without equal in history is growing. 
, ':This concentration is 'seriously impairing the eco- 
nomic effectiveness of private enterprise as a way of pro- 
vidi~?g employment for labor and capital and as a way of 
assuring a more equitable distribution of income and 
earnings among the-people of the Nation as a whole. 
"Private enterprise is ceasing to be free enterprise and 
is becoming a cluster af private collectivisms; masking 
itself as a system of free enterprise after the ~merican 
model, it is ih fact becoming a concealed cartel system 
after the European Godel." I 
In-  this manner the President called attention to the 
seriousness of the problems to be studied by the newly 
appointed Temporary National Economic Committee. * 
* TNEC was created by-a joint resolution of Congress (public Res. 
No. I 13, 75th Gong.), approved June 16, 1938. (Ther work- of the 
committee was completed in March, 1941.) The committee con- 
sisted of members of the Senate, Rouse of Representatives, and 
various Federal departments and agencies. It  was ihstructed by 
the re501ution "td make a full and complete study and investigation , 
' with respect to the matters referred to in the - President's message 
of April 29, 1938, on monopoly and the copcentration of economic. 
power in and financial control over production and distribution of 
goods and services. . . ." 
Public hearings began ' December I, 1938, and were held inter- 
mitten tly thereafter for 18 months; 552 wi tnesies appeared and 
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This committee% investigation - of the concentrtrtion of 
economic power in the united States is the first such 
I large-scale government investigation since the Congres- 
sional Pujo Committee in igie exposed the money trust. 
~ h o u ~ h  the TNEC study covers many phases of the 
nation's economic life, throughout there runs one ' funda- 
mental theme-the dominant power and position in 
American life of corporate big busi~ess, of monopoly, of 
concentrated private economic 'power. / 
~rescnting what it calls the "counts iil the indictment 
of monopoly," TNEC Monograph No. 2 1, cornpet it ion 
and Monopoly in American Industry, surnm&.zes the 
destructive effects of tnonopoly on American economic 
+ 
life: \ - 
It "inflicts no penalty on inefficiency." Regardless of 
what the monopolist does, "his hold upon the market is 
A A , 
. assured." 
"The ~rionopolist may engage in researdi and .invent 
. new materials, methods and machines, but he will be 
reluctant to make use of these inventions if. they would 
'compel him to strap existing equipment or if he believes 
their ultimate profitability is in doubt . . . his refusal to 
cut prices. deprives the community of a* gain." 
Monopoly "causes an u'neconomic allocation of pro- 
, ductive resources" @ and "prevents the full utilization of 
'productive capacity; . . . A large -part of the productive 
plant is condemned to idleness." 
YBy refusing to sell at figures that would' move his 
goods the monopolist leaves factories idle and labor un- 
employed. . . . By stabilizing price, the monopolist un- 
stabilizes the whole economy." 
testified. More .than no,ooo printed pag'ks' of testimony and 3,300 
techni'cal exhibits appear in the records, whi.& run into 8n -large 
voliimes-37 of hearings and 43 of special monographs, as well as 
the two final reports. All facts, figurm. and quotations in this 
pamphlet, unless otherwise spedified, are from these volumes. 
8 
\ 
Monopoly "impedes the raising of the general plane of % 
living . . . .it makes the total -output of goods and services , 
smaller than it otherwise would be." , b ,' 
It "contributes to inequality in the distribution of in- 
- come. . . . A more nearly perfect mechanism for making 
the poor poorer and the rich richer could scarcely be 
d euised ." ' [Our' emphasis.-Ed .I . 
MONOPOLY OBSTRUCTS WAR EFFORT 
By far the: most serious of ' the TNEC 'criticisms of 
rnti~opoly relate to its harpful effects on the nation's war 
production potential: 
"Nonopolyimpairs democracy's ability to defend itself 
in time of war. National defense requires an expansion 
of output: monopoly seeks to augment its profit by re- 
stricting output and maintaining price. -It thus obstructs 
- the procurement .of arms 'and supplies, increases the cost 
of defense, adds to the burden of debt and taxation, ah& a 
undermines national porale. When . the Nation is 
attacked, it may even turp the balance from victotyr tof - 
defeat." [Our emphasis.--El I I 
In. di&ussing the attitude of "business" (which means 
big business) in time of war, sthe TNEC says: , 
''Speaking bluntly, the Government and. the public are 
'over barrel'. when h comes to dealing with business' in 
. time of war or other crisis. Business refuses to work, ex- 
cept on - terms which it dictates. It controls the natural 
r *resources, the liquid assets, the strategic position in the 
country's economic st1 ucture, aild-. its technical. equip- 
ment and knowledge of processes! The experiknce of the ! 
World War, now apparently being repeated, indicates 
that business will ~ i s e  this control only if it is 'pqid 
. properly.' In effect, this is blackmail, not too fully dis- 
guised." 3 
At the final hearings, 04 February 12, 194 1, Assistant 
Attorney General Thurman Arnold made charges against 
certain sections of American big business amounting al- 
most to accusations of treason. I 
Referring to the investigation dy the Anti-Trust 
Division of the Department of Justice of industries in- 
volved in war production, he dehared: 
+ 
"I. The united States ~overnrnent has been charged 
excessive and unreasonable prices for essegtial war mate- 
rials as a* result of agreement between domestic and 
foreign companies, and collusive bidding on Army and 
Navy contracts. . - 
"9. Foreign companies [mainly German companie~- 
Ed.1 have taken out Datents and entered into cartel 
' 
zrringements in the Un~ted States on essential war mate- ' 
rials - for the purpose and with the effect of blocking 
American dev610pment and &a ting serious shortages. 
"3. There have been divisions of world markets by 
patent agreements between domes tic and foreign com- 
panies which give .foreign interests the right to determine 
where and how the American companies may sell certain 
military supplies. 
. "4. It 'seems probable that vital- military information 
has been disclosed to foreign companies though the re- 
quirement of itemized descrip tiye royalty payments in .- 
patent license agreements." 4 
, 
Arnold further disclosed that civil or crimink actions 
had been started by the Anti-Trust Division in the itIu- 
minum, military optical goods, tungsten carbide, airplane 
fabric, bentonite ar6d magnesium industries, while grand 
juries were investigating drug, aviation precision equip- - ment and surgical instrument and equipment1 firms. At 
least 3 1 . other industries producing vital war materials 
were then awaiting investigation because of the Divi- 
sion's lack of facilities to deal with ' them. 
His Division, Arnold said, was. constantly uncovering 
startling instances of '~erman control in vital American 
war, industries. Among the American monopofi&named 
in this connection were Aluminum Company of America, 
Dow chemical Co., Bausch & Lomb Optical Co. and 
. Beryllium Corpol.ation. In the spring of 1942, some time 
' after the dose of the TNEC hearings, Arn~ld  told - a 
Senate committee that Standard Oil Company of New 
Jersey had, as a result of international cartel connection 
with-the Nazi trust I. G. Farbenindustrie, blocked the 
development of synthetic rubber in the United States. 
Standard had refused to reveal its processes to the U. S. 
Navy and the British government while making them 
available to Germany and Italy through I. G. Farbenin- 
dus trie.5 f 
SUPER-PROFITS 
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' "Appreciable monopoly power is said to exist when- 
ever a single seller or a number of sellers acting in unison 
control endugh of the supply of a broadly defined com- 
modity to enablc them to augment their profit by limit- 
ing output and raising prices." s 
Monopoly power appears in various forms. Basically 
it is the power to control important resources, to dom- 
inate markets, and to fix prices. Its purpose is to secure 
an extraordinary or super-profit in, addition to the aver- 
age, or ordinary, business profit; 
Super-profits are the badge of monopoly, and the do- 
main of super-prdfits is big business. The'bulk of cor- 
porate wealth and income is located in a comparatively 
small number of big corporations. Summaries of cor- 
porate income tax Yeturns for 1937 show that the 894 
largest corporations in this country-less than 1/10 of 
1% of the total number reporting-owned about 45% 
of the total 'corporate assets. 
\ a  11 . ; c f  \ 
: 9 -  
The distribution of net income [i.e, ' profits] alse is 
highly concentrated. In the first place, 285,810 corpora- 
. tions reported no net income .in 1937, while ign,o28 
corporations reported net incomes. Of these lauer cor- . 
poration~ only 248-i/ 10 of 1%-had net incomes of 
$5,000,000 and over, but this group received 40% of the 
total net income' of all incom&reporting corporations.7 
A study of monopoly profits in 1937 showed that out of 
a group of 591 large corporations cbvered, more than a 
third, accounting for approximately half of the income' 
of the group, "reported profits of more than 1501, on in- 
vestment." The study concluded: - "It is obvious that 
the Federal taxes affect 'monopoly' profits only to a very 
minor exgent." 
The history of the Aluminum Co. of America reveals 
the super-profits of monopoly. In the 50 years from the 
time of its original incorpor'atiori as the Pittsburgh Re- 
duction Co. in 1888, up to 1939, its net income exceeded 
$335,ooo,ooo. In 'the 24 from 1889 through ig i e 
it made $33,0~0,ooo on an original investment of $z,ooo,- 
ooo. Its average annual return on in~ested'ca~ital dur- 
ing various perioda was: 35.7% from 1905 to i 908; 17.6% 
from igog to 1914; 19.3% from 1915 to 1918; 9.4%-in 
i g ~ g  and 1920. Following 9 loss of 2.3% in 1921 and, 
1924, the return was 10.2% from lgzg to igeg; and 2.6% 
from 1930 to 1934. The company averaged nearly 12% 
on invested capital from 1935 to 1939. Its net profit in 
1939 was $36,600,000 and in 1940 over $44,ooo,ooo, the 
largest in its historj..@. 
united Shoe ~achinery Corp. provides another exam- 
ple of the s ~ ~ e r - ~ r o f i t s  of mono pol^. In its early years 
the company made huge profits, paid large dividends in 
cash and in stock and built up 'a substantial surplus. 
From 1925 to 1930 the average annual return on its. capi- 
tal stock and surplus stood at 11%; in 1931 and 1932,. 
8.5%; and from 1938 through 1937, morecthan 13%. No 
12 
. wonder Fortune titled an article on the corporation "But 
Business Is Always Good!" lo 
METHODS OF GROWTH 
Apologists of monopoly explain its growth and exten- 
sion as the "natural" result of the advantages of large- 
scale, mechanized mass production and of the great capi- 
tal pools required for organizing such large-scale pro- 
duction. 
There is no denying the role of technological develop- 
ment, but this development, and the fordation of capital 
associated with it, takes place under conditions which are 
far from "natural." T ~ U S  monopoly is also a ". . . p.rod- 
uct of formal agreements and secret understandings; of 
combinations, intercorporate stockholdings, and inter- 
locking directorates; of the ruthless employment of su- 
perior financial resources and bargaining power; of un- 
. equal representation' before legislatures, courts, and ad- 
ministrative agencies; of the exclusion of competitors 
from markets, materials, and sources of investment funds; 
of restrictive con tracts and, discriminatory prices; of 
coercion, intimidation, and violence. 
"It is t& product, too, of i,astitutions of .property 
which permit private enterprises to take exclusive title 
to scarce resources; of franchises, permits, and !licenses 
which confer upon -their holders exclusive privileges in 
the employment of limited facilities and the perfarman~ 
of imprtant services; of patents which grant to their 
owners the exclusive right to conlrol the use of certain 
machines and processes and the manufacture and sale 
of certain goods; of tariffs which exclude foreign pro- 
ducers from domestic markets; of statutes 'which exclude 
out-of-State producers and ordinances which exclude out- 
of-town producers from local markets; of legislation 
which limits output, fixes minimum prices, and handi- 
caps strong competitors; and of inadeq'uate enforcement, 
13 
over many years, 'of the laws that . are . designed to preserve . . .
cbmpetition." l1 
1 
Summed up, the facts on the concentration of wealth 
and ownership in this country show that: 
1 : A relatively few corporations own the greater part. , 
, of the coulitry's productive wealth. 
2,. A relatively few people own the corporations. Actual 
control of the, corpora'tions is exercised by an even 
smaller number. 
-8;' Thes. controlling intkrests~ of different corporations 
are .related in such a manner as to form a. handful of 
highly integrated power groups. r *  
"We know that most of the wealth and income of the 
\ 0 
country is owned by a few large corporations, that these 
corporations in t.vn we owned by an infinite~imail~ 
small number. of people and that. the profits from the 
operatio* .of these cw~orations go to , a very' small 
group. . . . ." l2 
I '  
The "private industrial corporation . . . is. frequently 
' a huge collective enterprise affecting the entire national 
community, owned by a few, managed.by still fewer and 
bdund together with other similar enterprises and finan- 
- cial institutions by a variety of devices in an industrial . 
and commercial empire which does not possess the char- / 
acteristics we call democratic.'' 
' .  The most .irhportani methods by-which the corporate. 
,giants -are bound together in interest groups, exercising 
control by meak other than majdrity stock ownership, ' 
are interlocking directorates; intercorporate stockhold- 
ing~, services o f  large financial institutions, and an in- 
* 
- dividual's or group of individuals' ~wnership of ik- . . , 
portant stcxkholdings in several corporations, various 
114 
. trade and : general busibes -association$, and-sonhetimes 
a-  tacit acceptance of non-competition." 14 
The total iif wealth contxolled by corporations. in this , 
country, as measured by the assets of 437,777 individual 
corporations-submitting balance sheets to the U, S. Treas- 
ury Department, a&ounted to Over $303 billion ind I 997: 
Of these, the $94 largest corporations, or less thgn 1/10 
of 1 % of the total,, owned about 45% of the total cor- 
porate assets.+ / 
A speciar Securities pnd Exchange Commission (SEC) 
stydy prepared for the "TNEC showed the distribution 8f . 
owhership in the zoo largest non-financial corporations in 
the United States. ' These 200 giants owned 40% of the . 
1 
assets of all non-financial corporations, and accounted for 
nearly 45*0 of the .dividends distributed by such corpora- 
- l tions. Their capital stock was valued at 65% of the total 
- ' of all n~n-financial'corporations listed on the -~ew '  York 
S.tock and Curb Exchanges 'at the end of 1987.16 
The SEC study showed also the great concentration of 
, corporate ownership. 1t fovnd that in 1937, io,o& per- 
sons ,(o.o080J, of ' the populatioq) owned a fourth, and 
. j5,ooo krsoris (0.06% of the population) fully one-half of 
all corporate stock held by individuals in this cohntry.17 
About half of the estimated eight to nine million stock- 
holders in the country have 'an annual incbme fr6m divi- .. 
/dends of less than $look and the group which depends 
economically ' to a large extent on earnings from stock 
investments does not number much more than 500,om. . 
Since control of a corporation may be exercised 
through many devices other than outright ownership of 
, stkick, the SEC report . warns at the outset that "The high ' 
degree of concentratibn of ownership found in this study . 
must, therefore, be regarded as the minimum measure .of 
contrd over the .zoo largest non-financial American cor- * 
porations, exercised 'by a small numb& of lar e stock- 
- holdersa7'l? - .  . B . ,Ti. 4 
I 
There. were about 8,500,ooo individual shareholdings 
recorded in the ooo giant corporations. ~ h e s e .  were held - 
by approximately g,ooo,ooo stockholders (shareholders) 
, since on the average every stockholder held shares in . 
three different stock issues. The highest 1% of recorded 
shareholdings accounted for about 60% of the common 
stock of the 200 giant corporations. 
* 
Furthermore, .the 20 largest shareholdings in 208 issues 
of common stock, about one-twentieth of I % of ail shark 
holdings, had a value of nearly 32% of the total value 
of these common stocks. 
Concentration of stock ownership was most appareilt 
in the utility, automobile, -lumber and paper; building 
rnatGr&l and equipment, and chemical and drug indus- 
tries. In these the percentages of common stock held in 
the oo- largest shareholdings were, respectively, 49.2%. 
54.3%140.60/0, 36.2% and 33*8%.19 
The SEC report called attention to the very important 
fact that a single or closely linked ownership group may 
be broken up into a large number of separate sharehold- 
ings through a variety of devices, for example, trusts and 
holding companies. Thus both ownership and control 
are more concentratell than the study of the 20 largest 
shareholdings reveals since such shareholdings are con- 
nected and their influence is wielded in a united manner. 
The "largest blocks of stock are in most cases in the 
hands of a rather small group having a community of 
interest based either on family relationship, on corporate 
ties, or on long-standing business connections." . 
An analysis of the 2 0  largest stockholdings, company 
by company, made with the intent of locating the dom- 
inant control in the respective companies insofar as it was 
based on stock ownership, further strengthened this .COG- 
dusion. No account was taken of control by bankers or 
officers or directors witbout substantial stocli ownership. . 
This walysis reveaIed that in 40% of the 200 giant 
16 
coriorations, one family or a small number of families* 
exercised control through a majority or, more frequently, 
a substantial minority of the voting stock. In another 
30% of the 200 cor~orat&5ns, one or more other corpo'h- 
tions exercised conk01 but some of these were in turn 
con trolled by family or other .interes t groups21 
In only 30% of the corporations was there reported to 
. be no domidant of stockholders.. Although this 
30% included U. S. Steel Corp. and American Telephone 
& Telegraph Co., it should be noted that these companies 
were dominated in other ways. A study of the National 
Resources Committee found them to be put  of the so- 
called Morgan-First National ' coriorate interest group, 
the basis of control being mainly interlocking directors 
and investment 'banking relationships. 
In. its -special study of .three family groups, the du 
Ponts, the Mellons and the Rockefellers, the SEC showed 
that through stocQoldings alone these three families con- 
trolled 1 5 non-financial corporations with assets of over 
$8 billion, or about 1 1 % of the total assets of the 200 
largest non-financial corpora tion s. , 
, These three families also control big financial corpora-. 
tions (for example, the Rockefeller family controls the 
Chase National Bank) and through such control and by 
other devices they exercise &mination over. other cor- 
porations which are not mentioned in this study.* 
The SEC study, as indicated, confined itself to contr~l 
based on stock ownership and to this extent understates 
the degree of effective toncentration. . 
Another report prepared for the TNEC shows that the 
concentration of control of cbrporate wealth is greater 
than the concentration of actual ownership in the formal 
legal sense. This report cites a study prepared by Gardi- 
? See Anna Rochester, Rulers of Ametico, International Pub- 
lishers. . 
,n& Means and associates which showed that in igyj, of. 
the 250 largest corporations (including the 50 largest 
financial ones), 106, owning 60% of combined assets, 
coyld definitely be assigned, as far as ultimate control is 
concerned, to one of eight corporate interest grouis. The 
five most important groupings were Morgan-First Na- 
tional; Rockefeller; Kuhn, Loeb; Mellon; and du Pon t .22 
Another study of 200 large corporations . (not exactly, 
identical with the- 200- corporations in the SEC ,report) 
shws that in 88% of these, accounting for 94% of the 
assets, control rested with groups owning less than a 
mdjority of the capit!al stock.23 This, of course, do& not 
contradict the SEC study which showed that controlling 
gr0u.p~ usually dominated a substantial or strategically 
located minority block of capital stock. , 
CONCENTRATION OF PRODUCTION 
. Concentration of production is df fundamental irnpor- 
, tance in the development of.monopoly. Even if the con- 
centration is not sb high as ' tb constitu t& monopoly der se, 
. * ,  
xt leads to monopoly. "I-t i s  easier to effect collusions, 
I ,  understandings, or agre,ements among a few producers . 
: .than mong  many. . . ." 24 , 
Thus concentration of production furnishes a founda- 
tion far various other types of monopoly control. This 
\ #\means of 'course that simple statistical data on the coq- 
centration of ,production will understate .the range of 
effective ' ~oncen tration of control of production. 
Most of the TNEC data on concentrati~n of produc- 
tion refer to manufacturing induitries where ap impor- 
' tant index of ddncentration is the size ,of, the individual ' 
' manufacturing plant. This indicates the ease or diffi- 
' culty of entrance of new'capital into the industry. . 
he average size, of manufacturihg plants has been t 
Increasing steadily during the pdst three decades, due a 
- \  largdy to the increasing importance in the national . I econ- 
8 - 18 \ 
omy of l&ge-scale industries, mainly steel, motor vehicles 
and parts, electi-ical , machinery, and chemicals. 
' . 
The index of quantity output per manufacturing plant 
-increased from roo .in the base year ag 14 to 154 in 1999, 
and to 85 in 1937. And the TNEC condudes that . a 
, , 
"marked reduction in the nupbe,r of. smaller establish- 
ments and a .moderate increase in the number of larger 
. establishments ocCUrced after 1 gng." 26 
, Another important index of kon(=entration 'of produc- 
tion in manufacturing iddustries is the growth 'of the 
so-called cen tral-office companies. These own two .or 
more manufacturing .plants which are cantrolled from - . 
a central 'ackniriistrative office. A1 though such companies 
were only 5~~8%. of all' 'manufacturing concerns in -1 937,. -- 
- they 'employed 5 1 % of all wage earners, paid 55% of the. 
' total wage bill; and produced 61 % of the. total value of . 
all manufactured products. I 
The increase in concentration is indicated by a corn-, . 
parison. (not entirely &kt). of the 1937 . figures above 
with those for 1929. In 1929, central-office. fiims emL * 
- .ploy& 48%< of all wage'eainers and produced 54% of 
the value of all .manufactured output. 
Another indi&tion of cohcentration of production-is &e 
*fact that the 50 largest manufacturing companies owned 
on the average 57 plants each, whereas the rest of the 
6entral-office companies averaged only four 'blants each. 
The 50 largest companies represented less than one-tenth 
, of- 1% of all manufacturing companies in 1937, yet they 
produced- 28% of the total value i f  all manufactured 
' products akd' paid ovei. a fifth of' thi, total wages. 
k: 1937 s&dy of concentration of the production 'or , 
i ,807 - different manufactured products covered a group 
-, which constituted about one-half .&f the total number and 
value of ~anufactured- products given :in chat year's. 
cen'sus. , For each of these products, the concentration of 
prbduction was expressed as a perceniage of the ,total - 
I ig . 
value of .U. S. production supplied by the leading four 
manufacturers of that product. This percentage, is called 
the "concentration ratio;" 
Approximately one-half of the analyzed products had- , 
concentration ratios above 75%. This means that- for 
. one-half of the 1,807 products studied, the leading four 
manufacturers of these goods produced 75% or more of 
total United states output. Three-quarters of the 
analyzed products had concentration ratios of 50% or 
more< while more than a fourth (27%) had ratios of 
90%- 
The -manufacture of capital. goods was more highly 
concentrated - than that of consumers' goods. Thus, about 
80% of the products falling into'ihe capital goods cate- 
g&y had concentration ratios above 5001,, whereas 66% 
of the consumer items were in high concentration . - 
brackets. I I 
The manufacture of products , - whose 'raw materials 
cahe from agricultural sources showed lower concentra- 
' tion than1 those produced from minerals: 43% of the 
former and 69% of the latter had concentration ratios 
of 50% or more. 
1n Competition and ~ o n q o b  i n American KndUstry 
(Monograph NO. 2 1) there is a table of 12 I products tak- 
en from the'ig37 sample of 1,807 products, whose $slue 
. - bf output that year was mofe than $ ~o,ooo,ooo and whose 
- concentration ratio exceeded 75%. It included various 
steel, aluminum, copper, tin, nickel, rubber, rayon, coal 
. tar and other chemical products. , Others listed were 
au tomobilis, tractors, * trucks, aircraft engines, motors, 
telephone and telegraph apparatus, power transformers;, 
typewriters, adding machines. cash registers, refrigerators, 
radios and various glass products. Among the more im- 
portant basic consumers' goods in the list were sugar, 
wool, meat packing and tobaico products, matches, corn- 
-. starch, and* canned meats. 
Among the 1,807 products in the sample for 1937 were 
$32 in which 5 to lo concerns supplied, the entire output. 
1 
CONCENTRATION IN STEEL 
Steel is an example of a highly concentrated industry. 
Ten companies owned 88% of the industry's assets in 
1937; four companies owned more, than 66%; two com- 
panies owned 55%: The U. S. Steel Corp., with 400/,, 
was two and one-half times as large as its closest rival, 
- ~ethlehem Steel .Gorp., and Bethlehem was nearly twice 
as large as the third concern, Republic Steel Corp. 
Capacity to produce the most important products is 
similarly concentrated. For steel ingots, U. S. Steel then 
had 35% of productive capacity, Bethlehem 14%~ and 
Republic 9%. Seven other of the ten leading companies 
*each had no more than 5%. 
U. S. Steel is the giant of the industry. Its manufac- 
turing capachy was greater in 1997 than that of all Ger- 
man produceri combined, more than twice that of the 
entire British steel industry, and double that of all the 
French mills cornbined.26, 
Because of its tremendous size and its high degree of 
integration, U. S. Steel is in a position to dominate the 
. field. In addition to its facilities for producing pig iron, 
steel ingots, and all forms of finished and semi-finished 
steel 'products, the corporation,, in 1937, owned and 
operated through some 150 subsidiaries, nearly 2,000 oil 
and natural gas wells, 89 iron ore mines, yg coal mines, 
some 40 limestone, dolomite, cement rock, and clay 
quarries, a number of gypsum and fluorspar inines, 2 zinc 
mines, a manganese ore mine in Brazil, over 5,000 coking 
7 ovens, several water-supply systems with reservoirs, filtra- 
tion plants, pumping stations, over loo ocean, lake and 
river steamers, 506 barges and tugs, railroads, fire brick 
plants, and mills proiiudil?g in,ooo,ooo barrels of cement. 
I 
I 
DQMLNANT. FIRM UONOPOLI~ ' 
, . --. , , - *  
1 i: 
7 In some industries concentration + .  has .reached ,the point 
where . one or two c~mphnies control' iine-tenth; of  the 
supply. .A pattial ,list of industries where there is only 
one domtnant ' company is given below. ' , .  
. .  . .  
Industry 
I . '  
Aluminum ;Aluminum CS. of. . r America 
. ~hoe'rna&i&~ , .  b _ .  uiniied shw ~ a i ~ r y  . .  CO. 
Glass container machinery Hartford-Empire Co. 
Optical, glass . 1 Bawh & Lomb Optical Co. . .  
I 




Inter~ational Yickel, Co. a£ 





Telephone . service A d c a n  Tei. & Tel. I Co.. 
.~nternational coinmunications: L 
Trans-Pacific co&u- . . c commercial Pacific Cable 
1 8 %- * Co. . 
' .  
nications 
Point-fo-point radio teleg- RCA ~drnmunicatiod, 
raphy to no' countries Inc. 
Radistelephony I , 
4 
American .- l Tel. & Tel. .Go. 
pullman '.cars Pullman Co. 
~rans-oceanic aviation panoAmerican Airways ' - 
. (~rans-at Ian tic, ' - trans- 
Pacific, Caribbean) 
i 
Beryllium The Beryllium Corp. 
,CORPOR=4T-E MERGERS 
4 / 
The merger of independent business upits is a very 
. important process which speeds up concentration of pro- 
duction. There- have been three great merger move- 
ments ip American business history, one in the 'eighties 
and early 'nineties, the second at the turn of the ce~tury 
and the last one in the post-war* period, igig to 19.29. 
The Clayton 'Aliti-Trbt Act of i 9 a 4  has been ineffec- 
tive in, corporate mergers, according to the 





64  From 1919 to 1939, inclusive, ' g5,ozo corporations- 
hive gone out of industry and commerce. This is, at the 
average rate of more than 4,5w annually. Many of these 
losses have been by merger. . . . , 
"It was clearly through process of merger that pxedomi- 
nant corporations were built up in tobacco, petroleum, 
steel, farm machinery, da'iry products, wheat, - .  flour and 
. meats among others." 27 -. 
As to the effect of such concentration, the FTC's repre-- 
sentative testified: C 
"The Commission believes that one of the prindary 
causes of, the recent depression and of its long duration 
was artificial restraint of trade inducing high prices, pro- 
gressive inability of great dasses of people, to purchaie, 
and resulting unemployment. The depression was not 
. met in many industries, 'as normalIy in times of depreS- . 
sibn, by reduction of pri'des but by a concerted effort* to 
maintain the high levels so that the usual means *f bring- 
- *  ing the mass of buyers baclf on the market .did not be- 
comk operative and unemployment persisted. To this , 
disastrous process highly organized industries most large- -& 
ly cbntributed and particularly thrqugh the concentra- 
93 9 
tion of power in these indusiries resulting from. 
I mergers." 28 d 
THE PATENT MONOPOLY 
patents are another impor tan t device of monopoly . 4 .  control. I 
1 
:'No one can read the testimony developed before this 
committee on patents without coming to a realization 
that in many important segments of our economy the 
privilege accorded by the patent monopoly has been 
shamefully abused. It is there revealed in striking 
fashion that the privilege given has not been used, as 
was intended by the framers of the Constitution and by 
the Congress, 'to promote the progress of science and the 
useful arts,' but rather for purposes completely at vari- 
ance with that high ideal. It has been used as a- device - to control whole industries, to suppress competition, to 
restrict output, to enhance prices, to suppress inventions, 
and to discourage inventiveness." 29 
- Some of the ways in which patents promote monopoly 
are outlined. as follows: 
"The patentee [i.e., owner of the patent] who licenses 
other firms to operate under his patent rights may in- 
clude in his contract provisions which are designed to 
preserve, strengthen, and extend his monopoly. He may 
prescribe the quantity that his licensees may produce, the 
territories in \which they may sell, the customers with 
whom they may .d$al, and the prices which they must 
charge, thereby limiting their freedom to compete. He 
may insist that they buy exclusively from him, thereby 
restricting the market available to his competitors. He 
may require them to buy unpatented materials from him, 
thereby extending his control into fields where his patent 
24 
s no& apply. His power to refuse or withdraw licenses - 
may thus be employed as a weapon whereby varying de- 
grees of power over the markets for various products may 
be acquired." 30 ,' 
FiKe typical cases, showing the way in which the 
patent law operates .to t&e advantage of monopoly, 
were cited in Monograph No. g i  on Patents- and Free 
' En t erprjse 1 - 
Telephones: By 1934 American Telephone & Tele- 
,graph Co. had 9,255 patents of which 1,307 had never ' 
been put to use. Some nine improvements were found 
by the Federal ~ommunications-  om mission which had 
been deliberately withheld by A. T. & T. for from nine 
to over 30 years. "The point i s  that the public interest 
' , is not a factor in the judgment to release, defer or sup- 
press" the' patent. The  corporation.'^ profit has appar- 
ently been the sole criterion, . e / 
Electric light bulbs: Some %q7 manufacturers of electric 
light bulbs are all under mandate of and pay royalties to 
General Electric Co. .and Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. 
Co. While costs to the two compariies have been sharply 
cut, the retail price of bulbs, as a result of price-fixing 
- aqangements, has been' reduced only one-third since 
1921. Competitors who could cur prices were afraid .to 
risk infringement action by General Electric Co. -Al- 
though the original Edison patent expired some. 45 years 
ago, denerd Electric CO. has kept control by patents on 
small improvements and on production processes. 
Beryllium: -The products of -this ore are of great si& 
. nificance in the war program. American production~ras 
under Control of an 'international cartel in which Ger- 
-man monoply played a big part. This cartel had divided 
territory, restricted output and fixed prices. The Beryl- 
lium Corp. produced this defense material under 
licenses of Siemens 8e Halske, giant German trust which 
- 25 
- permitted no other b e a k .  proddc'ers t~ use , L their ' 
patents. . . , , .  . . b 
Glass contai'ncrs.: ~ h a n k s -  to the present patent system, 
Hitrtford-Empire Co. licensed and collected royalties . 
from firms. accoGnting *for 96.601, of the output of, the 
glass container industq. And of the three independents 
(controlling the r&aining : 3.4% .of the output), two 
were being sued for infringement of patent at the time . 
of the investigation. # f 
, Automobiles: Here, patent pooling is- practiced among 
the big fim. In the );ears . i g ~ p o ~ j ,  some 547 patents 
were pooled. This pocal makes available to &members 
inventions which are already commonly used; gut. de- 
sign patents -md new inventions are withheld, and only 
. "improvements" in traduced. 1 
patent monopolies bave seriously interfered 'with, war 
production. I 
, .  The "interchange of .patents- betuieen American and 
?foreign concerns has been used as. a means of cirtelizing 
an industryx to effectively displace competition. The 
, - prduction of vitally important materials, such as beryl-. 
lium, mapesi~m, optical glass, and chemicals, has beeh 
restrained through international patent controlsand 
aoss-licensing'which have divided the world markt into 
closed areas. As a result, the capacity of American in- 
. dustry>to produce these materials is not adequate -to meet 
the needs-of the defense program." 31 I 
The sa*e* type of restrictive use of patents ,was later 
found to exist in the vital synthetic rubber . industry. 
They contributed to the critical wartime rpbber shortage. 
, CONTROL OF PRICES, PRODUCTION 
, AND SALES 
bider the system of free enterprise, or, more correctly, 
the system of private capitalism, prices. are supposed to- 
26 
\ act as a sort of regulator and st'abilizer -of industry. 
Capitalist economic theory hoMs that the possibiiity of . 
rapid adjustment of economic relationships which exists 
under a system of flexible and competitive' market prices 
at least partly compensates for the, lack of over-a0 eco- 
, 
nomic planning. ) 
This "system of free enterprise can exist," says the 
TNEC, "only if industrial markets are free from manipu- 
lations and controls of private groups. Then alone can 
prices freely perform their function as the regulator and 
stabilizer of industry. But abundant evidence exists to 
show that in a vast range of commodities prices, far from 
being objectively determined in the market [i.e., deter- 
mined by the free play of competitive force's-~d.], -are 
influenced, administered, ,or managed by persons of 
power, so that price competition has 
industrial fields." 32 / 
"Unlike such products as wheat, over whose price no 
individual buyer or seller can' exert any appreciable in- 
fluence, the prices of such comaodities as &eel, alumi- 
num, automobiles, cigarettes, and bread are all subject ta 
a substantial degree of control by a limited number'of 
executives in. a few large companies." 
s- 
- The object of price control or price stabilization by the 
large corporations is to increase 'or stabilize their profits. 
Within the scope of their economic control they attempt 
to carfy out plans to achieve such an end. This plarining 
is, of course, quite different from over-all social planning 
for the welfare of all. It is an bnco-ordinated private 
planning of separate, though largei corporate gioups, 
. each with a view to its own profits. Its main result is to 
rob the capitalist . system of the degree of adjustability 
that exists under free competitive price conditions. 
Monopoly "obstructs adjustment to economic change 
27 
and thus contribute; to general induikial instability. . . . 
The necessary adjustments, when they occur, are violent 
instead of gradual. By stabilizing price, the rno&opolist 
.unstabilizes the whole economy." 34 s 
Managed prices permit the monopolized sector of the 
economy to exploit the competitive sector, the latter com- 
prised mainly of small -business and agriculture. This 
process, moreover, results in increasing unemployment: 
' "In the competitive kctor of the economy prices are 
fleGble; in the monqpolized sector they are rigid. In the 
former area, price is:cut to maintain output when de- 
mand declines. In theratter, outpdt is cut to maintain 
price. By refusing to sell at figures which would move 
- his g&ds, the monopbIist leaves factories idle and labor 
.unemployed.. ~onsumer income falls and, with it, the 
demand for products of competitive industries. The 
prices of these prducts are further depressed. Their 
producers can no longer buy the goods whose prices are 
maintained." 85 8 
- 
, * :. 
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President- ~odse;elt'e q q s a g e  af April ng, igg8, re- 
ferreh to the effect of man,aged:price ori employment in- 
' the following word;: @ - I 
'Wanaged industrial-prices mean tewer jobs. I t  is no 
add&at .that in' industriei -like cement and sreel where 
@ees.@wz zeniained firm in' the face of a falling dembd 
- ,  
pay r011d'hav shrunk as much as 40% and 50% in recent 
months. Nar is ;it merexhance that in most competitive 
induskies where prices adjust themselves quickly -to fall- 
ing demand; - pay rolls and employment have been far 
better maintained. By pGces we mean, of course, the 
prices' of the :finished articles and not the wages paid to 
workers." , . 1 
28 $$! % 
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"Where one or' a few firms dominate a trade, price 
, leadership is likely to obtain. If a single firm overtops 
its rivals, it may invariably take the initiative in raising 
or lowehng the price. If two or more concerns are dom: 
inant, one may habitually serve as leader oe more than 
one may lead, each in a different territory or each, in 
turn. The smaller firms in such a field will follow the 
' changes that itre announced and sell at the prices that 
are set. , They may be subjected to hidden pressure by . 
the leader. They may fear annihilation in the warfare 
that would be-provoked by an attempt to undercut him. 
They may seek to ob'tain larger profits by tiking refuge 
under the price umbrella which he holds over the trade. 
They may merely find it convenient to follow his lead. 
In any case, they . abandon independence of judgment 
' and adopt his prices as their own."36 
I 
Evidence of such "price leadership" was found, for 
example, in the sale of steel, cement, agkicultural imple: 
ments, gasoline, ' non-f errous metals, newsprint , paper, 
glass containers, and cxvde petroleum. . H 
Another type of private price control occors whqe 
coinpetitors enter, into agreements establishing and main- 
taining uniform prices. Such agreements afk likely to 
-exist in markets where a few producers control most of + 
the shpply. - They are plainly violations of the anti-trust 
- laws, yet thk Federal Trade  o om mission has uncovered 
many such agreements. Among the industries recently 
charged with such practices were rayon, tin plate, turbine 
generators and condensers, liquid chlorine, calcium. 
chloride, fertilizer, metal lath, gasoline, newsprint, to- 
, bacco products, and typewriters. In addition, indications 
of price agreements have been found in the steel, irpn , 
ore, chemical, nitrogen, and potash industries. 
.* 9 
In industries producing heavy products the cost of 
transportation of the product from factory to buyer is 
an important part of the delivered price or cost to the 
buyer. Where monopoly elements in such an industry 
a+e strong enough to- bring about, by means of. price 
leadership or price agreement, a System of uniform prices 
at the 'producing factories, it is quite likely that such 
uniformity will be reinforced by a system of uniform 
charges for freight'. I 
To achieve "delivered price" uniformity the com- 
panies calculate freight costs from a common basing 
point regardless of the a c t d  location of the producing 
plant. Thus under the old "Pittsburgh Plus" system in 
the steel industry, buyers paid the cost at the producing 
factory plus transportation costs from Pittsburgh, the 
basing point. The delivered price to a buyer in Chicago 
was consequently the same whether the producing plant 
was 'located in Pittsburgh, Chicago or Birmingham. 
. I 
CARTELS AN-D TRADE ASSOCIATIONS 
. {  ' One qf the most . important factors in the growth of 
monopoly since the First World War has been the de- 
.velopment -of cartels and cartel-like organizations such 
as trade associations. % 
, A cartel is Fn association based on an agreement 
between. corporations for the purpose -of exerting a 
rn~n~~o l i s t i c  . influence - on the market. Through such 
organizations monopolistic contrql may be e~tended even 
into fields where there are, numerous producersc How- 
ever,. the strongest cartel-like arrangements exist in in- 
dustries where the number, of companies is relatively 
small. . ,  / 
Dr. Theodore J. Kreps, T ~ E C  economic adviser, said 
' of the development of cartels: 




which require advanced macnlne technology and heavy 
tipvestment in plant and equipment. They crop up1 
wherever patents or market outlets or mineral'deposits 
are cQnkentrated in , +  few hands." 37 
, Concentration of production lays the groundwork for 
- the 'formation of cartels. Of the conditions hece~sai.~ f6r 
the formation of cartels,. Dr. Kreps saki: 
! ,  
"It..helps , if products are standard articles of 
mass consumption, if productive processes are highly 
mechanized; if the sources of supply whether of taw ma- 
terials, laibor, or patents are few, and if  the minimum 
and optimum size of plants is large. . . : Cartels really 
don't operate effectively until, due to 'various techpical 
sit,uations, control has been concentrated in a few hands, ' 
where decisions need to be .made by relatively few people 
to have an important influence on the 'market." , 98 
,- Cartels, oil& formed; iead to still greater concentration. 
I 
,"Under certain . cofiditions," Kreps concluded, "they 
may become the- rcaff olding for man&polistic structures . 
- . and gigantic business combines $hi& begin by dictating 
trade practices, ,prices, production, and sales and cul- * 
minate if unchecked in dictatorial corporate* statism" . 
[i.e., domination of the government by business corpora-' 
? I tions-Ed.] .a9 \ b a 
The simplest and supetficiall y the - m*& t innocuous 
type of cartel is, the so-called ''term" cartel 'in which the. 
members agree to regulate + sales terms. For example, 
they may, have uniform conditions of delivery with regard' 
t~ terms of payment, discounts and the l?kke. .Such agree- 
. ments are comrpon, in the United States, in the form of 
trade ptactice conference codes sponsored by various . . 
trade associations. I _  . \ 
More important is the price-fixing cartel which +regu- 
gi  . 3 
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lates sales prices, eithir by open price lists or by uniform 
cost accounting systems.   ere the cost elements, such as 
the price of raw materials, wages, the allocation for over- 
head and the gross profit margin' &e uniform. Such 
agreements are illegal in this country, but American 
ttade associations provide the vehicle through which 
corporations achieve results equivalent to those of open 
price-fixing cartels. . 
More advanced types of cartels regulate output or 
divide up. sales, territories or customers among various 
companies. Such quota cartels have operated here 
among building materials dealers, and in the copper, 
cot tan yarn, textile, oil refihing, elevator manufkcturing, 
window glass, anthracite coal, meat packing, glass con- 
tainer, incandescent lamp, and other industries. 
TRADE ASSOCIATION PRACTICES 
In 1940 there were about 2,000 national trade assocf 
ations in the U. S. Many of these ' are weak organiza- 
tions operating in industries where there are a large 
number' of producers. As indicated above, cartel-like , 
organizations tend to be most effective in industries 
where there are a few big corporate units. , 
"The national associations of steel companies, manu- 
facturers, bankers, *ailroads and electri; utilities are 
largely dominated by big corporations and thus consti: 
tute an extension of their irifluence." 40 - 
A study of 1,244 national and regional trade associ- 
ations showed that over half of them (53.9%) engaged 
in activities described as "combating unfair competi- 
tion." Over 977; of them were engaged in so-called 
industry cost studies.41 These cost studies are a dis- 
guised method of bringing about uniform prices. Dr. 
Clair Wilcox described to a TNEC hearing the way this 
* 
works: 
"Trade aseat ions go on to standardization of meth- 
ods of calculating costs, establishing the prices at which 
raw materials we to be included, or the treatment of 
overhead. The next step is the standardization of the 
amount- of profit induded in costs. - As Burns * says, the . 
resulting figure then becomes a desired selling price."*Z 
Trade associations apply pressure to individual sellers 
to force them to adhere to the recommended common 
-cost figures by various means-for example, by recom- 
mendations in their publications, by resolutions passed 
at meetings, or persuasion by, association officials. 
An important problem *of the trade association is keep- 
' 
ing clear of the Federal anti-trust laws. The first big , 
growth bf trade associations came after igio when the 
Supreme Court weakened the anti-trust laws, by itS 
enunciation of the so-called rule of reason in the Stand-. 
ard Oil case. Trade associations had their greatest 
growth during the period of  the First' World- War and 
during the life of &&National Industrial Recovery Act, 
both being periods in which the enforcement of the anti- 
trust laws was relaxed. 
In spike of lax enforcement by the Department. of 
Justice there have been numerous cases in which trade 
associations have run afoul of the anti-trust liws. For 
example, there are. ."-no6 associations which have been 
named as defendants in anti-trust proceedi~gs by the 
Department of Justice. Many of these assodations have 
been defendants in one or more cases since March 24, 
1938.' It is probable that this list does not exhaust the 
instances in which unlawful restraints of trade- have d& 
veloped among trade associations. The personnel of the ' 
Anti-Trust Division has been, insufficient to investigate 
and prosecute all' substantial complaints which have 
come to its attention. Theke is reason to believe that a 
* Prof. Arthur Robert' Bums, author o f  Decline of Competition. 
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oader program of investigation would have resulted 
in .cases against addiiional associations.'"-48 
In addition there have been several hundred cases in 
which the Federal Trade Commission has banded down 
"cease and desist" orders concerning activities of trade 
associations. 
The National Industrial ~ecovery Act (NIRA) in tro- 
duced compulsory cartelization in the U. S. 'through the 
industry codes provided for 'in the 'Act. Trade associ- ' 
ations played an important ,part in the ini'tiatip' and 
administration of these codes. Under some codes, the 
trade association itself was the code authority; in others, 
i t  selected the code authority or a majority thereof. In 
general, trade' association and c ~ d e  authority officers and 
executiviis were. the same. A special study of the U. S. ' 
. . '  
'Departmept of Commerce revealed that in about 600 
out of 850 codes, the secretary of the code authority and 
[the chief executive of ,the tta& &sociation had the 
same name and did business at the same address.44 
The TNEC investigation revea!ed that the later 
opposition ~f businew interests to the .National Recovery 
Administration was not a reflection of their opinion 
of the cartel .features of the codes. As Dr. ~ r e ~ s  ex- 
plained: { 
< 5 
"I do not doubt that the emergence on the NRA 
- Board of a majority genuinely interested in the welfare 
of consumers and laborers may'have been conducive to 
the lack of interest on the part 'of business in the 'NRA 
device. ~usiness did not like the wage-hour provisions 
and in particular resented section 7A which provided for 
coll'ective 'bargaining. As the ,quotation from the pam- 
phlet issued by the United States Chamber of Commerce 
shows, business liked the cartel features of NRA, the - 
production and &ntrols. The. NRA was a quid . 
pro quo. The Government gave business the right to . 
34 - 
combine if business would meet certain wage-hour, re- 
quirements. Business then liked and still desires to get 
together in production, sales and prices. What business 
did not like was the non-cartel features of NRA." (Our 
emphasis;-Ed.) 45 . 
CHANGING FORMS OF MONOPOLY *%?;a .-,,:, r_8 
* !  I":. :$$;~il.t*~.&l&#ii 
One of the main achievements of the Congressional 
Pujo investigation of the money trust in i g i ~ - i s  was its 
exposure of the high degree of control exercised by 'finan- 
cial and banking institutions over railroads, public utili- 
ties, insurance companies and major industries. 
This committee' showed that a cardinal feature of 
modern monopoli was the integration of big finance and . 
,big industry. The American economic system could no 
longer be accuiately desdribed as a system of industrial 
capitalism; it had become a system of monopoly capi- 
taIisrn.46 
The TNEC produced no -evidence of any weakening 
in the integratibn of the financia1 and industrial .sides of 
big business. On the contrary, it showed that the re- 
sources of finance-investment and commercial banking 
and the security exchanges-were largely barred to 
smaller business and were largely a monopoly of big 
business. 1 
It substantiated also the findings of Anna Rochester 
, in her basic study of finance capital in the United States, 
Rulers- of America, ' prepared u d e r  the direction of ' 
Labor Research Association. 
Nevertheless, the TNEC indicated that financial insti- 
tutions have not been playing the same dynamic role in 
the oeanization and extension of monopoly that they 
had played in the period preceding the First World War. 
The growth of monopoly, since that war was attributed 
to the "lax enforcement of' the anti-trust laws, the ' im- 
petus'of price-fixing given by World War I, the tremen- 
dous development of trade associations during the 'twen- 
ties which increased price-fixing, the NRA experiment 
t 
in 1933, and the great merger movements. . . . a' 47 - The TNEC placed particular emphasis on the process 
of cartelization, which, as-noted above, is the organizing 
of entire industries for the purpose of curtailing or elim- 
inating competition through price-fixing, output limita- 
' tion and other means. 
- One of the most significant features of the price-fixing 
activities of cartels and trade associations is that they 
seek to maintain prices at a "level that will keep even 
the highest cost firms in existence and give to a e  others 
abnormally high returns." 48 
Thus modern monbpoly seeks, as one ikp*rtant obj,ec- 
tive, to stabilize or freeze the existing s e w ,  to eliminate 
the dynamic factors in a capitalist economy. This ob- 
jective was observed to exist in other connections-in the 
- well-known tendency of modern monopoly, for example, 
to restrict technological progress. This was not so char- 
acteristic of the earlier or more progressive p&iod of 
capitalist development. 
~ E C L I N E  OF BANK CREDIT 
The weakening rqle of banking as a dynamic factor. 
in the economy is demonstrated by a number of impor- 
tant facts, one of which appears in the field of commer- 
cial banking. The growing financial self-sufficiency of 
large business enterpfises in. the United States has ren- 
'dered them to a large degree'independent of bank credit. 
Thus, while +in 192 1 commercial loans constituted 52% 
of the loans of ~ederal  Reserve member, banks, .by 1938 
these had fallen to 23%.*9 The greater -part of the in- 
vestments of commercial banks is now in government 
securities, longrterui corporate . bonds, real estate 'and 
loans. . 
36 
Commercial banks are thus becoming largely discon- 
nected from the financing of productive industry and are 
turning more 'and more into saving institutions investing 
in government bonds and "non-productive", loans. 1n 
this respect they are closely approaching the character 
of life-insurance companies and ordinary savings banks. 
GROWTH OF "NON-PRODUCTIVE" WEALTH 
The low rate of use of national savings for productive 
purposes, which is referred to below, has resulted in a 
great increase in so-called "non-productive',' wealth. 
U. S. Government bonds, for example, increased over $32 
billion in the ten-year period ending June 30, 1940. The 
concentration of ownership of "non-productive" wealth, 
however, appears to be somewhat lower than the con- , 
centration of ownership of productive industrial wealth 
as indicated by. the concentration of stqck ownership in 
non-financial corporations. . \ 
The ownership of tax-exempt government bonds, in 
so far as these are held by individuals, is highly concen- 
trated. Thus, in 1937, some 55,000 persons owned 62% 
of all such bonds owned by individhals with net incomes 
over $5,000.60 
However, a substantial fraction of the natien's "non- 
productive" wealth (government bonds, real estate 
securities and the like) is nominally owned by savings 
institutions (life insurance companies, savings and com- 
mercial banks, pension funds and similar agencies). A 
fair share of the obligations of ,some of these institutions 
is owned by the middle income groups. It is therefore 
to be expected that concentration of all forms of wealth 
combined is less than that of ownership of capital stock: 
Unfortunately data on the\ concentration of wealth as a 
whole are lacking,. but a few studies of concentration of 
, current savings out of income are available. , 
Since income saved arises largely from the profits of 
37 
accumulated wealth it is likely that the concentration 
. ratios for - current saving and -accumulated wealth are 
similar. A . study of savings. in 1935-36 showed that 
nehly 40% of current savings came from somk 110,ooo 
families and single individuals, or only 0.3% 'of the 
population.61 It appears that, tltough the concentration ' ' 
of savings is very high, it, as well as the concentration of 
"non-productive" weal thy is nevertheless somewhat lower , 8 
than hie ctjncentratioq of  oynership of productive in- 
- - 
dustrial wealth. The latter remains one of. the most 
striking evidences of '  the monopoly character of the 
American economy. 
DECLINE OF CAPITAL MARKETS 
An important indication of the 'declining function of 
financial institutions as a dynamic factor in the capital- 
ist economy is the fact that practically all the expendi- 
tures of American industry for plant and equipment 
in recept years have come from the internal sources -of 
the powerful corporations and not from borrowing in 
- 
the cqpital markets. Thus a study of 58 large industria1 
comp'ames, with aggregate assets of $12 b i lhn  in 1938, 
showed that' in the a ten years 1930-39, about goyo of an 
outlay of . $5.6 billion for plant, equipment and other 
investments camefrom internal sources, that is, from 
undistributed profits, reserves for depreciation and the 
like.62 
I - 
In contrast, the traditional capital market (stock and 
, bond issues and bank loans) provided only 10% of- this 
outlay of' $5.6 billion. In fact, taking all of American 
business enterprises in the aggregate, in no year between 
1922 and 1940 had the amount of productive capital ' 
obtained' through the regular capital markets touched the 
$2 billion mark. 
While .most of the funds invested in expansion of plant 
and equipment came from the direct savings of the 
h 
weal thy corporations themselves, such . savings were 
usually under two-fifths of the total annual savings of 
the national economy.53 ~ h ; e  rest of the savings were, 
for the most part, those of wealthy individuals out .of 
personal incomes deriveg from dividends, interest, rents, 
managerial salaries, and profits. 
When the industrial system is expanding, it 'draws 
aeavily on the savings of these wealthy individuals, and . 
the various institutions comprising the capital market 
constitute the necessary medium through which the 
draft of savings is accomplished. The declinipg impor 
- tance of the capital markets, therefore, reflects stagnation 
in the national economy itself. 
ECONOMIC STAGNATION 
'The failure, during the decade 1980-39, of the indus- 
trial system to expand at a rate requiring the reinvest- 
ment of the major part of available savingq is a result 
of the concentration of wealth in fewer and fewer hands. 
"Concentration of income and wealth," says the TNEC, 
, "is the most important single factor leading to a volume 
of capital expenditures inadequate for the mainte~ance 
.and expansion of the national income." This is due to 
the fact that "savings are made by individuals and,groups 
who do not or will not themselves consume the output 
of the capital goods. which their savings can create."s* 
As ''~a~ital'expenditures will not be made unless the 
output of existing facilities can be sold," the purchasing 
power of the people of the country must be adequate 
to buy back the increasing output. However, as the 
TNEC notes, "the increase in output of existing and 
new productive plant seems 'to outstrip the increase in . 
consumer purchasing power. . . ." 55 As a consequence 
industrial expansion comes to a halt and crisis and de- 
pression take-its place with their plague of idle men, idle 
, . 
machines and idle money.' 
All the, pha~es of economic smgnation noted abve- 
I the changed role of financial institutions, the small pop 
. ,  tion of available capital ciupply. used for productive pur- 
poses, the growing proportion of "non-productive" . .wealth 
and the unemplopent' of A n ,  machines, and money- 
@e related to- the development of monopoly in the 'na- 
tional economy. 
It i s  clear that economic stagnation (hreatens the main- 
' - tenance of the high level of profits which certain 
' monopoly groups have so actively promoted, It ispot 
, surprising, thereforef that these groups have reacted 
vigorou'sly to this threat, developing new land more 
aggressive methods of . \ securing ' and extending their 
I profitable exploitation. 
Economic eras cannot be s k d  up in phrases but if 
one attempted to characterize the era studied by the Pujo 
iqvestigation, roughly the 25 years before the ~ i r &  World 
War, it could be said that it was an era of active forma- 
tion of 'monopoly,. of creation of an immense pool of 
super-profit which monopoly sipho.ned off. 
The ex% &died 'by the TNEC .inveitigation, rohghly 
the 25 years preceding the present 'war, was one in which 
s m&opoly ~ u g h t  to stabilize its set-up, to -fight off decay 
and collapse, and to develop new and more aggressive 
methods to extend and secure itself. These methods, in. 
I so 'far as the economic sphere is concekned, aie best ex- 
pressed in the ~Gtelization of industry. * '  
GERM-~N AN<D -AMERICAN' CARTELS - 
' Germany has always been1 the. classic land .of cartek., 
' But. even ;here, where cartels were known long before 
the First world War,, the main growth occurred during * - and after that war, the process reaching its 'culmination 
in the compulsory cartelization introduced by the Nazi 
state. a I . . 
, Similarities between Germany and thi U. S. we& noted 
in the TNEC investigation. Thusy one expert, Dr. Her- 
bert von 'Bekerath, declared in his book, Modern Indds- .' 
trial Organization, that: "the number. (and importance) 
of cartelb and similar organizations in Germany is at least 
three times as large as it was before the [first World] war. 
The situation is similar .in most other industrial coun- 
tries, including the United States, where export cartels 
have been legalized, and an iricreGing number of cartel- , 
like organizations are developing in the domestic marke t. 
They are being developed successfully in forms which 
' avoid publicity and prosecution by the 
boards enforcing the anti-trust, laws, and they try to keep 
their activities within such limits as the government is 
able or willing .to permit." 56 . 
The cartel-like organization referred to here is the 
American trade associati'on' .whose price-fixing and other 
activities we have discussed above; 
Rudolf Calllhann, an international authority on car, 
tels, commenting on the similarity between the United 
States and Germany, observed: 
"In my judgment it is no mere coincidence that the 
*world depression was greatest, and sukequent recovery 
slowest, in precisely those two industrialized nations of 
. modern times, the united' states and Germany, - where 
efforts at 'rationalization or stabilization' by business- 
men had been most encouraged by their - respective gov- - 
ernments. . . s 9  ~ 7 .  I L 
"SELF-GOVERNMENT IN  INDUSTRY" 
. 1 
So-called rationalization and iabilization of ifidustry 1 
though cartel methods have been most actively advanced 
in the United States under the innocuous-sounding name . 
of "self-goGernment In industry," On this point Call-. 
mann declared: ."The car &el moveaen t and ~elf~govern- 
ment of industry are to a large extent identical." 68 In 
L . . 
. 41 
I 
I the United States the self-government in industry move- 
ment has been fostered largely by the trade associations. 
- The logical outcome of this movement was revealed to be 
the "'collec~ive determination of prices, the curtailment of 
output, the allocation of harkits and production, and 
the enforcement of these arrangements by the imposition 
of [penalties; in short, the complete cartelization of 
American business." 59 
The objective of "self-government in industry" is ex- 
pcessed'by its defenders in such terms as "elimination df 
kt-throa; competition," "adjustment df production to 
consumption," "planned economy of business." 
The difference between the big-business planning con- 
templated by the cartel or self-government-in-industry 
movement and genuine economic planning for the social 
welfare was explained. by Dr. Isador Lubin, U. S. Com- 
missioner of Labor Statistics, as follows: 
@ "I think your national and your international cartel 
is economic planning for a particular purpose, namely, 
the welfare of the people who control the cartel, as op- 
a 
' posed to a type of planning which may have as its enb ' 
lower prices, - greater distribution of goods, the higher 
standard of living for' the nation as a whole, and I can see 
where that type of 'planning would conflict definitely 
, with the type of planning that goes with a national or 
- international cartel where you are not concerned with 
your consumer at all, your consumer of the maximum'. 
, possible under the conditions under which .you oper- 
ate." a t 
Dr. Lionel Rabbins put i t  somewhat differently in his 
volume, The Great Depression, cited in the hearings: . 
I 
"The problem df planning is not to be solved by giving 
, each industry the power of self-government (i.e., restric- 
tion of entrv and production). This is not . . . ' 
42 . 
It merelv extends to whole industries the right to make 
plans fo; themselves similar to the right already enjoyed 
by individual entrepreneurs. But by eliminating com- 
petition, or potential competition, it ' creates a .state of 
affairs much less likely to be stable-much more likely t,o 
be restrictive-than the &called chaos of competitive 
enterprise." , 
POLITICAL PRESSURES 
~ h ;  TNEC noted that in its cartelized form, big 'busi- 
ness was capable of exerting terrific political pressure on 
, the various organs of government. '1n fact "government 
relations" 6r, more cbrrectly, high-pressure lobbying, is 
one of the main-.functions of trade 'associations and simi- 
lar organizations.. In a study of the political pressure 
exerted by business it was etated that by "business" was 
meant the "business community, as dominated by the 
200 largest non-financial Bnd the 50 largest financial cor- 
porations, and the employer and trade associations into 
'd which it and' its satellites are organized." (Our emphasis. 
-Ed.) 62 
/ 
This study of political pressures named among the fore- 
most big business pressure instruments such organizations 
as the Chamber of Commerce of the U. S., the National 
Association of Manufacturers, the Edison Electric Insti- 
tute, the American Bankers Association and the Asspci- 
ation of Life Insurance Presidents.63 
So powerful have these big business associations be- 
come that , they are sometimes referred to as the "Third 
House of Congress." According to the National Lumber 
Manufacturers" Associa tion', . "The reriresentation of a 
A 
territorial area or of 9 certain part of the population' 
often counts for less in point of influence than the indus- 
trial representation marshalled in a given cause."" This 
employer trade association contends that "industrial repi 
resentation" is inevitable. - 
a%. . 
'Industrial representation," as understood byemployersY 
associations, does not, of course, include any independent 
' labor representation. It suggests, rather, the system 
of "corporations," "chambers" or "syndicates" which is 
,the main underlying support of all fascist dictatorships. 
Although "ind~utria.1 representation" stops short of f as- 
cism, which openly' places government power ' in the 
hands of big business bodies, it would cleakly undermine 
the effectiveness of the democratic system and the politi- - 
- cal power of workers, farmers and small businessmen. 
The Germah exflrience is instructive. As Rudolf 
. , Callmann -testified with reference to the political influ- 
- ence of big business before the advent of the Nazi dic- 
tatorship: ' 
''in German> where there were also many goverw 
miental boar&, commissions9 - and lobbies, the heads , or 
representatives of the great corporations, cartels, trade.,- 
assoc$tions, chambers of commerce, and industry exerd 
cised ' important, and in manjy cases : domirian t, ' influence. 
Eventually, Jnd orie knew wha'had whom on the leash: 
the industry the Goverpment or- the Government the 





. ,  + ' 1 
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T& question which a pu~zled 'this , - ~xp&t.-&h* ' had ! 
, *kibi&i, on the leash-yiw clarified jh the operationii.. 
of the W&i state. German b;ig business, having nour- 
- . igh& the N&i . : ,  movemht to gnaiyrc'ity, turned the . state - , 
power ovt$ to its gangster cohortti. - The latter qui&ly .- 
moved inti5 the ranks ,of the big caiit~lists who ins tiq-n 
I* , ' n&fess quibH~'d~nhd'the ganpter uniform. TIE unity ; 
- of big, busihess , . \ .  and the &im.inal zindq-ld in the, Nyi 
: . -..st'kte'wa~ the: final outcome of .the btg business drivk for . 
' cumP1ete domination the. nqtionk eqonomi& life. - ' ' , 
. . h. &tide in "Fareign ~omme*ce , , .  
+ 'weekly," June 80, , 
a 942, says, ' that an odftsfand.ing economic result .of, the 
Nazi regime "has been a sharp accelerqtion in the trend 
toward emnomic concentration:" 
WARTXME DEVELOPMENTS ( 
1 
+ Based as- it has been on the TNEC investigation, which 
w e  largely completed before the initiation of the war-. 
time economy in the W&ted S~ te s ,  this booklet has 
necessarily taken little account of wartime developments. 
It is clear that to date the war production prokam hiis 
enormously hastened the process of economic concentra- . 
tion which is the heart of m6nopoly. This has resulted 
from the concentration of war contracts in large firms, 
from the necessary expansion of heavy industry at the 
expense of &e co&umers' goods iadustry, and from the 
general economic itislocation of wartime which tends to 
uvdermine small bpsiness with its weak reserves. 
Although the latest figures on concentration of war 
contracts aie not available, the War Production Board 
reported ,in Mayy q42: that I& l&e companies then 
held 76% .of all war supplies contra& of $~jo,ooo or 
more. .At the same time there were still at least I o$poo 
manufacturing establishments in the country not being 
used for wafproduction i6 any way. , 
As shown in the reports of the Truman Committee 
of &e U. S. Senate, investigating the progress of na- . 
tional defense, the war agencies and bureaus have been I 
largely dominated by dollar-a-year men. Many of these 
men tend to divert the war program in the intereit of 
their own corporate profits, both now and in the post- 
war period. They have hindered the efforts of those who 
have tried to show that war needs come first, and not con- 
solidation of the monopoly position' of any coiporation. 
If these big corporation groups 'were to mttintain their 
hold on the War Production Board and the supply 
boards of the armed services, the hand of monopoly 
would undoubtedIy be strengthened. But fordunatel j 
# 
- 45 
there are united forces of labor, progressives and others 
who have'been seeking to prevent 'this reactionary dis- 
ruption of the war program. 
Labor, the co-untry 's most powerful democratic force, 
is not only backing the gjovernment ~ O Q ~ ~  in the war. 
Through labor-management committees and through 
gowing represen tat ion on various government bodies 
it is making its voice increasingly heard in an Admin- - 
istration which enjoys broad popular support. This par- 
ticipation of labor is a fundamental requirement in a 
people's war-for naAona.1 survival. '1t is a guarantee that 
the defeatists - and appeasers, fifth columnists and other 
fascist-minded persons in the United States will not be 
successful in their drive to destroy national unity. 
Monopoly, as we have seen, always shows a fascist, 
antidemocratic trend both in its foreign and domestic 
policies and rela$ionships. It tends to play with foreign , 
interests of a like nature. Specifically, we have seen how 
the big corporate ihterests here have been linked with 
Nazi influence in many industries: aluminum, synthetic . 
rubber, magnesium, tungsten-carbide, drugs, dyestuffs, 
and a variety of other critical war rnaterials.66 
But the people's forces, if properly organized, can 
effectively counter the defeatist plans of these big busi- 
ness interests. Democratic forces can be. mobilized- to 
attack the fascist forces both on the foreign front and on 
the home front, to expose the maneuvers of any corporate 
interests which may be open or disguised friends of 
fascism. - 
Unity of all the people in the struggle against the 
worst tyranny in history is the present next step in the 
fight for a democratic world. The enemies of democracy, 
including the monopolists who would betray America, 
.are doomed to defeat through the victory of the United 
Nations over. t$e Axis. 
REFERENCE NOTES 
S. Doc. 173,75th Cong., 14 Bureaucracy and Trw 
gd session, p. 3. teeship in Large Cor@ra- 
Competition and Mo- tions, Monograph No. i 1, 
nopoly in American Zndus- p. 6. 
try, M o n w p h  NO. 8 1, p. - l6 Final -Report of the 
18. Executive Secretary, .p. 163. 
Economic Powr  and 10 Distribution of Own- 
Political Pre&hres, ~ o n o -  ership in the 200 ~srgest 
graph No. 86, p. 172. Non-finaacial  Corpora- 
* Final R-cport ~d Rec- tions, Mononograph No. 29, 
ommenddtions of the P ~ .  32, 23. 
TNEC, S. Doc 35, 77th 17 ibid., p xvii. 
Cong., , i s t  session, p. log. la Ibid., p. 7. 
6 See Labor Research As- 14 fbid., pp. hl, 6og. 
mciation's Economic Notes, .20 zbid., p. 3,. a-. 
- May and June, 1942. 21 Ibid., pp. xvi, 105. 
Final Report of the 22 Monograph N ~ .  p. 
Executive Secretary to the 8. . . 
TNEC, 77th Gong., 1st ses4 =A. A. Berle and G. C. 
sion, p. 1. Means, :The Modern ' Cor- 
Ibid., p. 169. P o r a t i o n a n d P r i v a t e P ~  . 
Taxatron of Corfwrate erty, dted on p. n i  <of Enterprise, Monograph onograph No. 1 1. 
No. 9, p- 90. 1 s4 Final Report of the 
@ Monogaph '" 13. Executive Secretay; p: 47. . 
72s 
10 Ibid., p. 79. . &e also '' Ibid', Po 3% 
Horace B,. Davis, Shoes: 26 Monograph No. 21, p. leo. -The Workerg and the In- n Final Report, and Rec- 
, dtistry, International Pub- 
lishers. ommendations, p. p S  1. 
l1 Final Report of the Ibid, p. 288. . 
' Executiut Secretary, I pp. ibid., p. i6. . 
28, 49. . 30 Final Report of thc < 
12 Final Report and Rec- Executive - SecretaPY, p. 20. 
ommendations, p. 9. 31 Final Report and Rec- 
. . ?s Ibid., p. 37. ' omnendations, p. go. 
47 
/ 
aa lbid., p. 88. 
as Final Report of the 
Executive Secretary, p. 67. 
s* Monograph No. o I, p. 
'7. 
36 ibid:, fi 17. 
3eFinal Report of the' 
Executive Secretary, p. i 2 1. 
Hearings, Pt. 25, p. 
i 3038. 
38 ibid. pp. 13082, i 3084. 
Ibid, p. 13083. 
40 Monograph No. 1 1, p. 
9. 
41 Final Report of the 
Executive Secretary, pp, 86, 
87- 1 
42 Hearings, Pt. 25, .p. 
13g12. 
rs Final Report to the 
Executive Secretary, p.' 88. 
44Hiarings, , Pt. 25, p.. 
13320. 
46 ibid., p. 13345. 
4a U. S  owe of Repre- 
sentatives, 62: 111, Report 
No: 1593, "Pujo Commit- 
tee" report, igq. - 
47 Final Report \ of the - 
~xecut ive  Secretary, p. 36. 
Is Hcclrings, Pt 25,. p. 
13316, quoting Prof. ,Ar- 
thur R. Burns. 
49 Final Rebort t o '  the 
Executive ~e&etary, p. og*. 
ibid., p. 190. 
5l  Ibid., p. 178. 
62 lbid., p. 228. 
53 ibid., p. 208. 
s4 Profits, Product iue Ac- 
tivities and New Invest- 
ment, Monogxaph NO. 12, 
p. xix. 
66 Ibid.,.p. xx. 
66 Hearzngs, Pt. ,25, p. 
1y061. 
Ibid., p. 13362. 
ibid., p. 13360, - 
Final Report of the 
Executive Secretary, p. 101. 
Hearings, Pt. 25, pp. 
130867. 
elibid., p. 13361. 
62 Monograph No. 26, p. 
3. 
63 ibid., pp. 14, 15. 
64 Ibid., p. g. 
Hearings, Pt. 25, p. 
13362.- 
- a6New York Times, 
March 26, ' 1942. 


